For (a) Ockham tells us in Ch. 12 that intentions or concepts are "of two kinds".5 The two kinds turn out to be first and second intentions. It seems therefore that every concept is either a first intention or a second intention. Hence, if terms of first and second intention were correlated with the first and second intentions themselves in the way supposed, it would follow that every conventional term is either of first intention or of second intention. But this does not seem to be so. The division in Ch. m seems to be such that only terms of first imposition in the strict sense are of first or second intention; other terms are of neither.6 6 Moreover (b) in Ch. 12 Ockham includes mental syncategoremata among first intentions in the broad sense. Hence conventional syncategoremata ought to be included among terms of first intention in the broad sense. But it seems they are not. Conventional syncategoremata are terms of first imposition in the broad sense, and it is terms of first imposition in the strict sense, excluding syncategoremata, that are divided into terms of first and of second intention. accipiendo 'nomen primae impositionis', sunt in duplici differentia, quia quaedam sunt nomina primae intentionis et quaedam sunt nomina secundae intentionis." See also the diagram in Swiniarski, cit., p. i87. 7 Summa logicae I, i 2, lines 59-60 : "Intentio autem secunda est illa quae est signum talium intentionum primarum." Ibid., lines 74-77: "Protest etiam dici quod intentio secunda potest accipi stricte pro intentione quae significat
